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Abstract—Large-scale power blackouts caused by cascading
failure are inflicting enormous socioeconomic costs. We study the
problem of cascading link failures in power networks modelled
by random geometric graphs from a percolation-based viewpoint.
To reflect the fact that links fail according to the amount of
power flow going through them, we introduce a model where
links fail according to a probability which depends on the number
of neighboring links. We devise a mapping which maps links in
a random geometric graph to nodes in a corresponding dual
covering graph. This mapping enables us to obtain the first-
known analytical conditions on the existence and non-existence
of a large component of operational links after degree-dependent
link failures. Next, we present a simple but descriptive model
for cascading link failure, and use the degree-dependent link
failure results to obtain the first-known analytical conditions on
the existence and non-existence of cascading link failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2003, a massive power blackout rolled across
northeastern U.S. and Canada, affecting some 55 million peo-
ple. The blackout resulted from a three-hour-long cascading
failure triggered by an undetected initial power line failure
in Ohio. Later that year, 57 million Italians were left in the
dark from a similar blackout. Around the world, the number
of outages affecting large populations has steadily risen in
the past decade, causing enormous economic losses [1]. As
a consequence, the resilience and reliability of power systems
have received increasing attention. Designing and constructing
a smart, resilient, and self-healing power grid has become a
crucial challenge for governments and industry.
The essential dynamic of power blackouts is a process
whereby the failure of a generating plant or a power line
results in redistribution of the power flow load onto other
nearby generators or power lines. If these other plants and lines
then fail due to excessive load, then this process can further
propagate and result in a cascading failure. A key question
for the designer of the power grid is: can we predict whether
a small number of initial failures will or will not trigger a
cascading failure affecting the entire network?
Previous work has examined the problem of cascading
failure from a number of perspectives. In [2], the authors use
a linear model for power flows. They model transmission line
failures as the result of overflow, and consider the dynamics of
power networks in time. In [3], the authors include the growth
of power demand, engineering responses to system failures,
and the upgrading of generator capacity. They characterize
two types of blackouts, one which is due to transmission lines
reaching load limits but incurring no line outages, the other
which is due to multiple line outages. They use simulations
to illustrate how their proposed model fit the data from
American blackouts. In [4], the authors characterize two kinds
of critical operation points of the power system, due to the
transmission line limit and the generator capacity limit, re-
spectively. They find by simulation that operation near critical
points could produce power law tails in the blackout size
probability distribution. In [5], the authors propose a method to
prevent cascading power failure by using integer programming
techniques. They consider the cost of upgrading the capacity
of transmission lines and calculate the optimal choice of
link upgrade to prevent the expansion of failure. As seen
by the brief review above, the current research on cascading
failures in power networks is primarily based on simulation
and optimization algorithms. Due to the complex nature of
the dynamics involved in cascading failures, analytical results
have been rather elusive.
In [6], the authors propose a new approach to analyzing
cascading failure based on the theory of percolation [7]–[11].
The perspective adopted in [6] is as follows: in a power
network subject to redistribution of load, the presence of
cascading failure can be assessed by whether or not a small
number of initial node (generator) or link (line) failures lead to
a large connected component of failed nodes or links affecting
the network globally. Percolation theory, which is concerned
with assessing the global connectivity of networks, provides
the appropriate viewpoint with which to make this assessment.
The authors of [6] propose a simple but descriptive model for
cascading node failure, based on node susceptibility thresholds
and degree-dependent node interactions. Within the context
of random geometric graphs, [6] presents the first analytical
conditions for the existence and non-existence of cascading
node failures.
In this paper, we adopt the viewpoint presented in [6].
Instead of examining cascading failure of nodes, however,
we focus on cascading link failures. This is motivated by the
fact that blackouts in power grids are often triggered by link
failures (line faults), which cause power flow redistribution
onto neighboring links, which when overburdened, can fail
and propagate the cascade. As in [6], we shall focus on
networks modelled by random geometric graphs, where nodes
are distributed spatially according to a Poisson point process
with constant density λ, and any two nodes within given
distance r of each other share a link. In doing so, we are
motivated by the following consideration. First, the topology
of actual power grids is not readily available. Second, we use a
random graph to model the ensemble topology of power grids.
Third, there is evidence that geometry plays an important role
in the topology of electrical power grids [12], especially with
respect to cascading dynamics. Finally, our work is intended
to provide insight into the dynamics of cascades within large-
scale power networks, and random geometric graphs provide
a concrete setting in which analytical results may be obtained.
This paper proceeds as follows. After presenting some pre-
liminary results on random geometric graphs and continuum
percolation, we study random geometric graphs in which
each given link fails (independently) with a probability which
depends on the number of neighboring links (links which share
an end node with the given link). This models the phenomenon
in power networks where the probability of a link failure
increases with its load in terms of power flow. The larger
the number of other links which share an end node with a
given link, the more power flow is likely to traverse the given
link, and therefore the higher the probability that the given
link fails. We present the first-known analytical conditions
on the existence and non-existence of a large component
of operational links after degree-dependent link failures. In
order to establish these results, we devise a new map which
maps links in a random geometric graph to corresponding
nodes in a dual covering graph. Finally, we present a simple
but descriptive model for cascading link failure, and use the
degree-dependent link failure results to obtain the first-known
analytical conditions on the existence and non-existence of
cascading link failures.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We use a random geometric graph to model the power
network. A rigorous model is as follows. Let Hλ be a
homogeneous Poisson point process with density λ > 0 in R2.
Let G(Hλ, r) be the (infinite) undirected graph with vertex set
Hλ and with undirected links connecting all pairs {Xi,Xj}
with ‖Xi −Xj‖ ≤ r (r > 0) where Xi,Xj ∈ Hλ. Due to
the scaling property of random geometric graphs [9], in the
following, we focus on G(Hλ, 1).
A fundamental result for random geometric graphs concerns
a phase transition effect whereby the macroscopic behavior of
the network is very different for densities below and above
some critical value λc. For λ < λc (subcritical or non-
percolated), the connected component containing the origin
contains a finite number of points almost surely. For λ > λc
(supercritical or percolated), the connected component con-
taining the origin contains an infinite number of points with a
positive probability [7]–[9].
Let Hλ,0 = Hλ ∪ {0}, i.e., the union of the origin and
the homogeneous Poisson point process with density λ.1 As
discussed, a phase transition takes place at the critical density.
1Note that in a random geometric graph induced by a homogeneous Poisson
point process, the choice of the origin can be arbitrary.
Definition 1. For G(Hλ,0, 1), the percolation probability
p∞(λ) is the probability that the connected component con-
taining the origin has an infinite number of nodes of the graph.
The critical density λc is defined as
λc = inf{λ > 0 : p∞(λ) > 0}. (1)
It is known that if λ > λc, then there exists a unique infinite
component in G(Hλ, 1). A fundamental result of continuum
percolation states that 0 < λc < ∞ [13]. Exact values of
λc and p∞(λ) are not yet known. Simulation studies show
that 1.43 < λc < 1.44
We have defined the random geometric graph in the infinite
graph setting. The finite analog of G(Hλ, 1) can be defined
as follows [9]. Let Xn = {X1, . . . ,Xn} be n points inde-
pendently and uniformly distributed in a square of area n/λ
in R2. Form a graph G(Xn, 1) by placing a link between
any two nodes i and j such that ‖Xi − Xj‖ ≤ 1. Let
L1(G(Xn, 1)) be the size of the largest connected component
in G(Xn, 1). Then it can be shown that as n → ∞ with λ
fixed, n−1L1(G(Xn, 1)) → p∞(λ) in probability. Thus, if
λ > λc, there exists a unique largest component of size Θ(n)
in G(Xn, 1). On the other hand, it can be shown that if λ < λc,
then the largest component in G(Xn, 1) can only have size
O(log n) [9].
While finite random geometric graphs are clearly of more
interest for practical applications, it is more convenient to
consider infinite graphs for expositional purposes. For this
reason, we will concentrate on infinite graphs in the rest of
the paper, while keeping in mind the correspondence between
the finite and infinite graphs.
III. DEGREE-DEPENDENT RANDOM LINK FAILURES
In the power grid, large-scale blackouts are often triggered
by power line faults. This was the case in the massive 2003
North American blackout. In our context, line faults can be
modeled as link failures. Thus, in order to further understand
blackouts in the power grid, it is important to characterize the
resilience of large-scale networks to link failures.
In power networks, the probability of link failure typically
increases with its load in terms of power flow. The larger
the number of other links which share an end node with a
given link, the more power flow is likely to traverse the given
link, and therefore the higher the probability that the given
link fails. To model this effect, we consider degree-dependent
random link failures. We first define the degree of a link.
Definition 2. The degree of link (i, j), denoted by d(i, j), is
the number of other links which share an end vertex with (i, j).
That is,
d(i, j) = di + dj − 2,
where di and dj are the node degrees of i and j.
Consider a scenario where each link in G(Hλ, 1) fails
(independently) with a probability q(k) that depends on the
link’s degree k. Let G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) be the remaining graph
after degree-dependent link failures. In order to study the con-
nectivity properties of G(Hλ, 1, q(·)), we construct a mapping
where the bond percolation process in G(Hλ, 1) is mapped to
a site percolation process in a covering graph Gc(Hλ, 1).
The covering graph of a graph G is defined as follows.
Definition 3. Gc(V,E) is called the covering graph of
G(V,E) if
1) Each node in Gc denotes a link in G, and each link in
G is denoted by a unique node in Gc.
2) Two nodes in Gc share a link if and only if the cor-
responding links in G share a common end vertex (in
G).
Comparing Definitions 2 and 3, we have the convenient
fact that the degree of a link in G is equal to the degree of its
corresponding node in Gc.
It should be clear that the covering graph of a given graph is
not unique. Moreover, in the context of geometric graphs, most
covering graphs are of little importance, for they hold only the
connection information, losing all the geometric information.
In order to utilize the geometric information in the original
graph, we need to place additional constraints on the geometric
location of nodes in the covering graph. Fortunately, we find a
construction for the covering graph which is particularly useful
for random geometric graphs with random link failure. In this
construction, the location of nodes in the covering graph is
directly determined by the node locations in the original graph,
thereby maintaining the geometric information.
Given G(Hλ, 1), we construct the covering graph
Gc(Hλ, 1) as follows.
1) Consider the circles with radius 1/2 and the nodes in
G(Hλ, 1) as the centers.
2) Let the mid-points of each link in G(Hλ, 1) be the nodes
in Gc(Hλ, 1).
3) Two nodes in Gc(Hλ, 1) share a link if and only if they
lie in the same circle of radius 1/2 in G(Hλ, 1).
The construction is illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Construction of the covering graph: the red nodes and links belong
to G(Hλ, 1); the blue nodes and links belong to Gc(Hλ, 1).
Theorem 1. The graph Gc(Hλ, 1) constructed above is a
covering graph of G(Hλ, 1).
Proof: First, each link in G(Hλ, 1) corresponds to a
unique node in Gc(Hλ, 1), which is the link’s midpoint.
Second, since the length of links in G(Hλ, 1) is less than
or equal to 1, two nodes in Gc(Hλ, 1) lie in the same circle
(of radius 1/2) in G(Hλ, 1) if and only if their corresponding
links in G(Hλ, 1) share an end vertex. Thus Gc(Hλ, 1) is a
covering graph of G(Hλ, 1).
One important consequence of the above construction is that
the nodes of the covering graph Gc(Hλ, 1) is also driven by
a Poisson point process, albeit of a different density.
Theorem 2. The nodes of Gc(Hλ, 1) are distributed according
to a Poisson point process with density λ′ = piλ22 .
Proof: To prove that the nodes in Gc(Hλ, 1) are driven
by a Poisson process, it is most convenient to focus on
the finite random geometric graph G(Xn, 1) where Xn ≡
{X1, . . . ,Xn} are n points independently and uniformly
distributed in a square A of area n/λ in R2. Now consider
the covering graph Gc(Xn, 1) of G(Xn, 1) obtained by the
construction above. For any i = 1, . . . , n, conditioned on the
location of Xi, the midpoint of any link between Xi and Xj
in G(Xn, 1) is uniformly distributed in the circle centered at
Xi with radius 1/2. Since the Xi’s are independently and
uniformly distributed in A, so are the midpoints, which are
the same as the nodes of the covering graph Gc(Xn, 1).
To calculate the density of Gc(Xn, 1), we note that the mean
degree of any node Xi in G(Xn, 1) (ignoring border effects
which diminish as n tends to infinity) is piλ. The summation
of the mean degrees of all nodes X1,X2, ...,Xn equals npiλ.
Now the number of edges of the graph should equal 1/2 of
the sumation of the degrees of all the nodes. Thus the mean
number of edges in G(Xn, 1) equals npiλ/2. Therefore, the
density of the links in G(Xn, 1), which is also the density of
the nodes in the covering graph Gc(Xn, 1), is given by
λ′ =
npiλ/2
n/λ
=
piλ2
2
.
The theorem now follows by taking the limit as n→∞ with
λ fixed.
It is important to remark that even though the nodes of
the covering graph Gc(Hλ, 1) are distributed according to a
Poisson process, Gc(Hλ, 1) is not a random geometric graph.
To see this, note that two nodes in Gc(Hλ, 1) being within
distance 1 of each other does not imply that there exists a link
between the nodes. Nevertheless, Gc(Hλ, 1) is a subgraph of
a random geometric graph with the same node locations as
Gc(Hλ, 1).
We now derive analytical conditions on the existence and
non-existence of an infinite connected component of oper-
ational nodes in G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) after degree-dependent link
failures in of G(Hλ, 1). The key techniques we use are the
mapping from a bond percolation process in the original graph
to a site percolation in the covering graph, and that link failures
affect network connectivity less than node failures at the same
level.
Our first main result gives a sufficient condition for there to
exist an infinite connected component of operational nodes
in G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) after each link in G(Hλ, 1) fails (inde-
pendently) according to a degree-dependent probability q(k),
where k is the degree of the link, as given in Definition 2.
Theorem 3. For any λ1 > λc and G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λ1,
there exists k1 <∞ which depends on λ and λ1, such that if
q(k) ≤ 1− λ1
λ
, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ k1, (2)
then with probability 1, there exists an infinite connected
component in G(Hλ, 1, q(·)).
An interesting implication of Theorem 3 is that even if all
links with degree larger than k1 fail with probability 1, an
infinite component still exists in the remaining graph as long
as (2) is satisfied.
Proof: The proof uses the concept of the covering graph,
the relationship between bond percolation and site percolation,
as well as key ideas from the proof of Theorem 1(i) in [6].
Due to space constraints, we shall only outline the key steps.
Consider two random failure models in G(Hλ, 1). In the
first model, each node fails (with all associated links) indepen-
dently with probability 1− λ1
λ
. Let Gsite1 (Hλ, 1) be the remain-
ing graph. In the second model, each link fails independently
with probability 1− λ1
λ
. Let G1(Hλ, 1) be the remaining graph.
Since λ1 > λc, Gsite1 (Hλ, 1) is a random geometric graph in
the supercritical regime. Let Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)) and G1c(Hλ, 1)
be the covering graphs (according to the construction given
above) of G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) and G1(Hλ, 1), respectively.
In the following, we use the square lattice construction
from [6]. Please refer to [6] for further details on the con-
struction. Consider the square lattice L = d · Z2, where d
is the edge length. As in [6], define event Asitea (d) for each
horizontal edge a in L as the set of outcomes for which the
rectangle Ra is crossed2 from left to right by a connected
component in Gsite1 (Hλ, 1). If Asitea (d) occurs, we say that
rectangle Ra is a good rectangle, and edge a is a good edge.
Let psiteg (d) , Pr(Asitea (d)). Define Asitea (d) similarly for all
vertical edges by rotating the rectangle by 90◦.
Further define event Bsitea (d) for edge a in L as the
set of outcomes for which (1) Asitea (d) occurs, and (2) the
left square S−a and the right square S+a are both are both
crossed from top to bottom by connected components in
Gsite1 (Hλ, 1). If Bsitea (d) occurs, we say that rectangle Ra
is a complete rectangle, and edge a is a complete edge. Let
psitec (d) , Pr(B
site
a (d)). Define Bsitea (d) similarly for all
vertical edges by rotating the rectangle by 90◦. An example
of a complete rectangle is illustrated in Figure 2.
We further define complete events {B′a(d)} with respect to
G1(Hλ, 1) in the same way as we defined complete events
{Bsitea (d)} with respect to Gsite1 (Hλ, 1). Similarly, define
2Here, a rectangle R = [x1, x2] × [y1, y2] being crossed from left to
right by a connected component in Gsite
1
(Hλ, 1) means that there exists
a sequence of nodes v1, v2, ..., vm ∈ Gsite1 (Hλ, 1) contained in R, with
||xvi − xvi+1 || ≤ 1, i = 1, ...,m − 1, and 0 < x(v1) − x1 < 1/2, 0 <
x2−x(vm) < 1/2, where x(v1) and x(vm) are the x-coordinates of nodes
v1 and vm, respectively. A rectangle being crossed from top to bottom is
defined analogously.
Fig. 2. An example of a complete rectangle. The circles have radius 1/2.
complete events {B′′a (d)} with respect to G1c(Hλ, 1), the
covering graph of G1(Hλ, 1), and define complete events
{Ba(d)} with respect to Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)).
We shall now carry out a series of stochastic couplings to
obtain our result. Since the critical link failure probability (for
i.i.d. link failures) is greater than or equal to critical node
failure probability (for i.i.d. node failures) in G(Hλ, 1), we
can stochastically couple G1(Hλ, 1) and Gsite1 (Hλ, 1) such
that the existence of crossings defined in events {Bsitea (d)}
for Gsite1 (Hλ, 1) implies the existence of crossings defined in
events {B′a(d)} forG1(Hλ, 1). Next, by using the construction
of the covering graph G1c(Hλ, 1), it is straightforward to ver-
ify that the existence of crossings defined in events {B′a(d)}
for G1(Hλ, 1) implies the existence of crossings defined in
events {B′′a (d)} for G1c(Hλ, 1).3
Let p′′c (d) ≡ Pr(B′′a (d)). By the coupling argument above,
we have p′′c (d) ≥ psitec (d). From [6], we know that psitec (d)
converges to 1 as d → ∞ when Gsite1 (Hλ, 1) is in the
supercritical phase. Thus, p′′c (d) also converges to 1 as d→∞.
Define
d(λ′, λ1) , inf
{
d > 4 : p′′c (d)−
1(
d
2
+ 2
) (
3d
2
+ 2
)
λ′
> 1− q0
}
,
(3)
where λ′ is the density of Gc(Hλ, 1), the covering graph of
G(Hλ, 1), and q0 , 19+2√3 . Now choose the edge length ofL as d = d(λ′, λ1).
Define event Ca(d) for each horizontal edge a in L as the
set of outcomes for which the number of nodes of Gc(Hλ, 1)
in R′a is strictly less than
k1 , 2
(
d(λ′, λ1)
2
+ 2
)(
3d(λ′, λ1)
2
+ 2
)
λ′, (4)
where R′a is the rectangle Ra extended by 1 in all directions.
Define Ca(d) similarly for all vertical edges by rotating the
rectangle by 90◦. If Ca(d) occurs, we call rectangle Ra and
edge a efficient. Let pe(d) , Pr(Ca(d)).
We say an edge a in L is open if and only if it is both
complete with respect to G1c(Hλ, 1) and efficient with respect
to Gc(Hλ, 1), i.e. when events B′′a (d) and Ca(d) both occur.
An edge is closed otherwise.
3To be absolutely precise, the definition of a crossing needs to be altered
slightly here, requiring the x-coordinates of the first and last node in the
rectangle to be within 1 of the boundary, rather than 1/2. However, this
alteration does not affect our results below.
When Ca(d) occurs for edge a in L, no node of
Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)) in Ra has degree strictly greater than k1 in
Gc(Hλ, 1). In addition, if q(k) satisfies (2), a link in G(Hλ, 1)
with degree k, 1 ≤ k ≤ k1 (or equivalently a node in
Gc(Hλ, 1) with degree k, 1 ≤ k ≤ k1), survives with a
probability greater than or equal to λ1
λ
in the degree-dependent
failures model. On the other hand, for the independent random
failures model, a link in G(Hλ, 1) (or equivalently a node
in Gc(Hλ, 1)) survives with probability exactly equal to λ1λ .
Thus we can couple Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)) with G1c(Hλ, 1) so that
the existence of crossings defined in events {B′′a (d)} for
G1c(Hλ, 1) implies the existence of crossings defined in events
{Ba(d)} for Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)). Therefore, a path of open edges
in L implies a connected component in Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)).
As in [6], we find
po(d) , Pr(B
′′
a (d) ∩Ca) ≥ p′′c (d) + pe(d)− 1, (5)
and
pe(d) ≥ 1− 1(
d(λ′,λ1)
2 + 2
)(
3d(λ′,λ1)
2 + 2
)
λ′
. (6)
By (3), (5) and (6), we have
po(d) ≥ pc(d) + pe(d)− 1 > 1− q0. (7)
Finally, we use the dual lattice technique in [6] to prove
the existence of an infinite open edge cluster in L, which
implies the existence of an infinite connected component in
Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)), and therefore an infinite connected compo-
nent in G(Hλ, 1, q(·)).
Theorem 3 provides a sufficient condition for G(Hλ, 1, q(·))
to have an infinite component. The next theorem provides
a sufficient condition for G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) to have no infi-
nite component. Thus, it provides a necessary condition for
G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) to have an infinite component. Here again, the
concept of the covering graph allows us to leverage Theorem
1(ii) of [6] to prove our new result.
Theorem 4. Given G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λc, let λ′ = piλ2/2 be
the density of the covering graph Gc(Hλ, 1). If either
e−
λ
′
2 +
∞∑
k=1
(λ
′
2 )
k
k!
e−
λ
′
2 q(k − 1)k > 1− 1
27
(8)
when q(k) is non-decreasing in k, or if
∞∑
k=1
(
λ′
2
)k
k!
e−
λ
′
2
( ∞∑
m=0
[λ′(2
√
2 + pi)]m
m!
e−λ
′(2
√
2+pi)×
(
1− q(m+ k − 1)k) ) < 1
27
(9)
when q(k) is non-increasing in k, then with probability 1, there
is no infinite connected component in G(Hλ, 1, q(·)).
Proof: The existence of an infinite connected compo-
nent in G(Hλ, 1, q(·)) after degree-dependent link failures in
G(Hλ, 1) according to failure probability q(k) (where k is
the link degree) is equivalent to the existence of an infinite
connected component in the covering graph Gc(Hλ, 1, q(k))
after degree-dependent node failures in Gc(Hλ, 1) according
to failiure probability q(k) (where k is the node degree).
In Gc(Hλ, 1), the nodes are Poisson distributed with density
λ′. The length of any link is at most 1, and any two nodes with
distance strictly larger than 1 do not share a link (although
two nodes with distance less than 1 may not necessarily
share a link). Now consider the random geometric graph
Gr(Hλ′ , 1) with density λ′ where the node locations are the
same as those for Gc(Hλ, 1). Let Gr(Hλ′ , 1, q(·)) denote
the remaining graph after degree-dependent node failures
in Gr(Hλ′ , 1) according to failure probability q(k). Since
Gc(Hλ, 1) is a subgraph of Gr(Hλ′ , 1), we can stochasti-
cally couple Gr(Hλ, 1, q(·)) and Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)) such that
if there does not exists an infinite connected component in
Gr(Hλ, 1, q(·)), then there also does not exist an infinite
connected component in Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·)), By Theorem 1(ii) of
[6], if either (8) or (9) is satisfied, then Gr(Hλ, 1, q(·)) does
not have an infinite component, and therefore Gc(Hλ, 1, q(·))
does not have an infinite component either.
IV. CASCADING LINK FAILURE
Cascading failure (blackouts) in power networks often result
from a small number of initial line faults triggering many
more line failures affecting the entire network. To understand
the underlying dynamics of such phenomena, we focus on
cascading link failures in large-scale networks modelled by
random geometric graphs.
Consider a network modelled by a random geometric graph
G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λc, where an initial failure seed is
represented by a single failed link. We are interested in
whether this initial small shock can lead to a global cascade
of link failures, defined as follows.
Definition 4. A cascading link failure is an ordered sequence
of link failures triggered by an initial failure seed resulting in
an infinite component of failed links in the networks.
To describe cascading failures, we use the following simple
but descriptive model similar to the model proposed in [6] for
cascading node failures. Assume that there is a “susceptibility
threshold” ψl ∈ [0, 1] associated with each link l, where
the ψl’s are i.i.d. random variables with probability density
function f(ψ). Due to local redistribution of power flow load
after link failures, each link l fails if a given fraction ψl of its
neighboring links (the links which sharing an end node with
l) have failed. The order of the failure sequence is then the
topological order determined by the location of the initial link
failure and the threshold ψl of each node l.
Note that the initial link failure can grow only when some
neighboring link, say m, of the initial failure seed has a
threshold satisfying ψm ≤ 1km , where km ≥ 1 is the link
degree of m. Such a link is called vulnerable. The probability
of a link being vulnerable is
ρk = Fψ
(
1
k
)
=
∫ 1
k
0
f(ψ)dψ, (10)
where Fψ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of ψl.
When the initial failure seed is directly connected to a com-
ponent of vulnerable links, all links in this component fail.
Thus, a cascade of failed links forms when the network has
an infinite component of vulnerable links and the initial failure
seed is either inside this component or adjacent to (share a link
with) some link in this component.
On the other hand, if link l has a threshold satisfying ψl >
kl−1
kl
, where kl is the link degree of l, then link l will not fail
as long as at least one neighboring link is operational. Such a
link is called reliable. Otherwise, if ψl ≤ kl−1kl , we call link l
unreliable. For k ≥ 1, the probability of a node being reliable
is given by
σk = 1− Fψ
(
k − 1
k
)
=
∫ 1
k−1
k
f(ψ)dψ. (11)
Note that when two reliable links share an end node and
neither is an initial failure seed, no matter what else happens
in the network, they remain operational.
The following two theorems present our main results on
cascading link failure in random geometric graphs. The results
depend crucially on the degree-dependent link failure results
in Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 5. For any λ1 > λc and G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λ1,
there exists k1 <∞ depending on λ and λ1 such that if
Fψ
(
1
k1
)
≥ λ1
λ
, (12)
then with probability 1, there exists an infinite component
of vulnerable links in G(Hλ, 1). Moreover, if the initial link
failure is inside this component or adjacent to some link in
this component, then with probability 1, there is a cascading
link failure in G(Hλ, 1).
Proof: We view the problem as a degree-dependent link
failure problem where a vulnerable link is considered “oper-
ational” and a non-vulnerable link is considered a “failure.”
In this model, each link with degree k fails with probability
1− ρk. Applying Theorem 3 directly, we obtain the result.
Theorem 6. For any G(Hλ, 1) with λ > λc, if
∞∑
k=1
(
λ′
2
)k
k!
e−
λ
′
2
∞∑
m=0
[λ′(2
√
2 + pi)]m
m!
e−λ
′(2
√
2+pi)×
(
1−
[
1− Fψ
(
m+ k − 2
m+ k − 1
)]k)
<
1
27
, (13)
where λ′ = piλ2/2 and Fψ(−∞) = 0 by convention, then with
probability 1, there is no infinite component of unreliable links.
As a consequence, with probability 1, there is no cascading
link failure in G(Hλ, 1) no matter where the initial link failure
is.
Proof: We apply Theorem 4. Regard an unreliable link
as “operational” and a reliable link as a “failure”. Then,
σk becomes the failure probability q(k) in the context of
Theorem 4. Since σk is non-increasing in k, we replace
q(m + k − 1) in (9) with σm+k−1 = 1 − Fψ
(
m+k−2
m+k−1
)
and obtain (13). Thus, by Theorem 4, when (13) holds, with
probability 1, there is no infinite component of unreliable links
in the network. Next, using the covering graph and techniques
from the proof of Theorem 2(ii) in [6], we show that if there is
no infinite component of unreliable links, then with probability
1, there is no cascading link failure no matter where the initial
link failure is.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of cascading link
failures in the power grid from a percolation-based viewpoint.
To reflect the fact that links fail according to the amount
of power flow going through them, we introduced a model
where links fail according to a probability which depends on
the number of neighboring links. We introduced a mapping
which maps links in a random geometric graph to nodes in a
corresponding dual covering graph. This mapping enabled us
to obtain the first-known analytical conditions on the existence
and non-existence of a large component of operational links
after degree-dependent link failures. Next, we presented a
simple but descriptive model for cascading link failure, and
used the degree-dependent link failure results to obtain the
first-known analytical conditions on the existence and non-
existence of cascading link failures. In particular, we revealed
the important roles played by vulnerable and reliable links.
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